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Abstract
Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly
quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in cable television
markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds
of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities.
Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer
significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar,
despite higher prices.
1. Introduction
In many markets, firms choose not only the prices but also the qualities of their
products. In many cases, this is the primary dimension on which firms compete,
as in pharmaceutical, media, and professional services and many high-technology
markets. Theorists have long recognized that in the presence of imperfect com-
petition, offered qualities can be distorted from the social optimum because
firms equate private instead of social marginal benefits and marginal costs (Dixit
and Stiglitz 1977; Spence 1980). This induces a welfare loss analogous to that
from price distortions. Indeed, aspects of a firm’s product offerings, and not
pricing, have been the focus of recent highly contested antitrust cases (for ex-
ample, Microsoft, GE/Honeywell).
The tendency of firms with market power to distort quality has been most
clearly formulated in the monopoly nonlinear pricing literature, in which it is
shown that the firm’s products suffer from quality degradation (Mussa and Rosen
1978; Maskin and Riley 1984). Because products of different qualities are sub-
stitutes, a monopolist cannot simultaneously offer each consumer his or her
efficient quality and also extract his or her full surplus, even with a fully nonlinear
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of Economic Research 2002 winter program meeting, the Society for Economic Dynamics 2002
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tariff. Instead, under standard assumptions, quality for all but consumers with
the highest tastes for quality is distorted downward. Furthermore, consumers
with low preferences for quality may be excluded entirely from the market.
Regulation, by either minimum quality standards or price caps, generally reduces
distortions but can have ambiguous effects on prices and welfare (Besanko,
Donnenfeld, and White 1987, 1988).
Despite the widespread acknowledgment of the potential for quality degra-
dation, measures of its extent and implications for outcomes in real-world mar-
kets are few. In this paper, we analyze quality degradation in a market long
thought subject to its effects: the cable television industry. To do so, we introduce
an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model that exploits the
optimality conditions for the monopolist’s quality choice problem to recover
measures of the quality of the monopolist’s offerings. This permits us to directly
measure how much cable monopolies degrade quality relative to a competitive
alternative. It also allows us to measure the impact of local regulatory oversight
on ameliorating monopoly quality distortion.
We present two main results. First, we find evidence of substantial quality
degradation in the cable television industry across a variety of specifications.
While some firms offer two or three goods, most offer just a single product
quality. Furthermore, offered qualities are at least 11.1 percent and 30.3 percent
less in three-good markets and 44.7 percent less in two-good markets than what
would be provided in a competitive market offering the same number of goods.
Second, we find that local regulatory oversight—in the form of certification
by the local franchise authority to cap cable prices—has important ameliorative
effects. Systems in franchise areas where the local franchise authority was certified
offer an estimated 25.1 percent more services, 24.1 percent higher quality for
low- and medium-quality goods (where offered), and greater quality per dollar
to consumers despite higher prices. These results are consistent with the impact
of minimum quality standards and could be of significant interest to policy
makers concerned about the effectiveness of past regulatory interventions in the
industry but troubled by continued growth in cable prices.1
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey the
canonical Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of monopoly quality choice that forms
the foundation of the empirical analysis. We also present extensions to this model
developed by Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1988) to allow for quality choice
in the presence of regulation. In Section 3, we describe the cable television
industry and discuss its suitability for this empirical analysis, followed in Section
4 by the empirical model and algorithm for recovering quality measures. Section
5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
1 The most recent report on cable prices by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
found prices increased by 5.4 percent for the 12 months ending January 1, 2004, slightly less than
the 5-year compound annual increase of 7.5 percent from 1998 to 2003 and far higher than the 1.5
percent increase in the Consumer Price Index over the same period (FCC 2005a).
Regulation in Cable Television 183
2. The Incentives to Degrade Quality
In this section, we discuss the quality degradation result from the theory of
monopoly nonlinear pricing using a simple, two-type version of the model of
Mussa and Rosen (1978).2 Consider a monopolist selling two goods, q1 and q2,
whose qualities can be freely varied over . Consumers are assumedQp [0, Q]
to be differentiated by a type parameter that takes on three distinct values, t0,
t1, and t2 ( ), with respective probabilities (with ) andt ! t ! t f f  f  f p 10 1 2 i 0 1 2
associated cumulative distribution function . Type 0, , is included
k
F {  f tk i 0jp0
to allow for the possibility that some consumers prefer not to purchase either
of the firm’s products.3 For convenience, we assume the hazard function for the
type distribution, , is increasing in i.4 The monopolist is assumed tof / (1 F)i i
be able to offer a nonlinear tariff specifying a different total price per quality
variant offered, P1 and P2. The firm knows the distribution of types in the
population and selects the tariff that maximizes its expected profit (with the
expectation taken over consumer types).
Consumer preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear in money, u { u(q,i
. A consumer of type is assumed to choose that bundle,t )p v(q, t ) P(q) ti i i
, which maximizes his or her utility, so thatqi
q { arg max u(q, t ), ip 1, 2. (1)i i
q q ,q{ }1 2
Furthermore, given that no consumer can be forced to participate in the contract,
the monopolist’s choice of qualities and prices must be such that the consumer
voluntarily chooses to accept the contract, which requires
u(q , t ) ≥ 0, ip 1, 2. (2)i i
Equations (1) and (2) are the incentive compatibility (hereafter IC) and indi-
vidual rationality (IR) constraints.
The firm’s optimization problem is then to maximize expected profits,
2
max E[p]p f [P(q ) C(q )], (3) i i i
ip1P(q)
subject to optimal behavior by consumers, as encompassed in the IC and IR
2 Since the derivations in this section are standard, we omit a number of technical details; see, for
example, Laffont and Tirole (1993, chap. 2) for complete details. Furthermore, the Mussa-Rosen
model has recently been extended by Rochet and Stole (2002) to allow households random private
values for the outside option, with interesting implications for the extent of and patterns in quality
degradation. We explore the differing implications of these models in ongoing work (Crawford and
Shum 2005) and note that the results we present here are conditional on our assumed form for
household preferences.
3 This “outside type” is generally not included in the typical theoretical exposition. We include it
here to facilitate empirical implementation of the model, in which there are always some consumers
who purchase the “outside good.”
4 This rules out bunching of types at a single quality variant. Wilson (1993, chap. 8.1) presents a
detailed discussion of the conditions under which this assumption is likely to be violated.
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constraints. The term is the firm’s cost function, which is assumed to beC(q )i
purely additive across consumers.5 Define the total surplus function S(q, t ){i
. Using a common trick from the screening literature, we can rewritev(q, t ) C(q)i
profits as the difference between the total and consumer surplus:
2
max E[p]p f [S(q , t ) u(q , t )]. (4) i i i i i
ip1u(q)
In this reformulated problem, the monopolist solves for the optimal utility
quality schedule and determines optimal prices (given utilities) from the binding
IC constraints. Under standard assumptions, we can use the IC constraint to
rewrite the objective function, which yields
max E[p]p f [S(q ,t ) u ] f {S(q , t ) [v(q , t ) v(q , t )] u }. (5)1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1
q ,q ,u1 2 1
This problem is solved by setting the utility of the lowest type to zero,
, and maximizing the resulting unconstrained objective function withu p 01
respect to and . The corresponding first-order conditions areq q1 2
1 F1
S (q , t )p [v (q , t ) v (q , t )] and S (q , t )p 0, (6)q 1 1 q 1 2 q 1 1 q 2 2f1
where . Quality degradation for the low type ( ) is visible fromv { v/q ip 1q
equation (6). The socially optimal quality for each type, denoted , is thatq**i
which sets the derivative of the total surplus function to zero, . InS (q, t )p 0q i
equation (6), however, we see that is chosen so that , which impliesq S (q, t ) 1 01 q 1
that : quality is degraded to low types. However, there is no degradationq* ! q**1 1
at the top for the higher type . Given optimal qualities from equation (6),t 2
optimal prices fall out naturally from the IR and IC constraints. Since ,u p 01
andp*p v(q*, t ) p*p v(q*, t ) [v(q*, t ) v(q*, t )]p p* [v(q*, t )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
.v(q*, t )]1 2
Figure 1, which is adapted from Maskin and Riley (1984), demonstrates graph-
ically the solution for the one-dimensional case with . At this point, weNp 2
focus only on the solid curves in that figure. The monopolist would like to
extract all consumer surplus by offering product qualities and andq** q**1 2
charging prices and , but with such an offering the high type wouldp** p**1 2
prefer to mimic the low and select (note for a given quality, consumer utilityq**1
is higher the lower on the figure they can locate). The constrained optimum is
given by variables with single asterisks. As above, the high type continues to
consume the efficient quality (and pays a lower price), but quality to the low
type is degraded, from to .q** q*1 1
5 We make the usual curvature assumptions , as well as the′ ′′v 1 0, v ≤ 0, v 1 0, c 1 0, and c 1 01 11 2
normalization that for all i. Furthermore, we maintain the standard single-crossingv(0, t )p 0i
condition that , which implies that higher types have greater willingness to pay (WTP) foru 1 0qt
quality at any price or that consumers may be ordered by their type, t.
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Figure 1. Quality degradation with two types adapted from Maskin and Riley (1984)
2.1. Continuous Types but Discrete Qualities
The theory described in the previous section applies also to the case of con-
tinuous types but to discrete qualities. To see this, suppose instead that consumer
types are continuously distributed on with probability density function[T, T]
but that the monopolist has decided to offer just two qualities regardless.f(t)
He or she may do so for a number of reasons. There may be fixed costs associated
with the design, production, or marketing of products of different qualities. Or
there may be incremental (especially marketing) costs of offering numerous
goods. If these are large, the monopolist will offer only those products that can
cover his or her fixed costs, limiting the number of products in the market
(Spence 1980; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977).
Suppose the firm offered arbitrary qualities . Who would buy theseq and q1 2
goods? All consumers for whom and would buyu(q , t) ≥ u(q , t) u(q , t) ≥ 02 1 2
good 2. Because of the structure of the problem—notably the single-crossing
condition—only the first of these constraints would bind. Let denote thet 2
consumer type that is just indifferent between purchasing the two goods and
denote the analogous consumer type just indifferent between purchasing goodt1
1 and the outside (or no) good. Then the share of the distribution of consumer
types that purchase each good, , is given by the integral under the distributionfi
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Figure 2. Continuous types and discrete qualities
between the type cut points: (defining and ). Figuref p f(t)dt t p T t p Tt∫ti1ii 0 3
2 presents a graphical representation of this framework. In that figure, type tA
lies between the cut types and and so consumes the lower bundle. Type tBt t1 2
lies above the larger cut type , and like that type consumes the higher bundle.t 2
For both types tA and (and for all types other than the cut types and ),t t tB 1 2
both the participation and incentive constraints hold strictly. The key result is
that given these qualities and associated shares , theq and q f , f , and f1 2 0 1 2
monopolist’s profit is described by equation (5) just as in the discrete-type case.6
An important consequence of continuous consumer types is that quality dis-
tortion will generally occur for almost all consumers. In particular, only the
highest cut type will consume an efficient quality ( ). All other types* **t q p q2 2 2
that also purchase the high-quality good (like tB) will necessarily receivet 1 t 2
inefficiently low qualities. Similarly, while quality will still be degraded to the
lower cut type ( ), it will be lower still for other, higher, types (like tA)* **q ! q1 1
that also purchase the low-quality good, . This is also illustrated int ! t ! t1 2
6 This is a subtle point. Were we to specify a particular continuous distribution of consumer types,
solving the firm’s problem for the optimal cut types, ’s, is a challenging problem requiring moret
sophisticated techniques than those employed here (Crawford and Shum 2005). The insight is that
even if firms are making these more sophisticated calculations, the discrete-type first-order conditions
must hold for the cut types ultimately chosen by firms.
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Figure 1, in which the two dashed curves are indifference curves for the types
tA and tB in Figure 2. Type tA, who consumes the same bundle as type , hast1
an efficient bundle that lies to the right of type ’s efficient bundle, which impliest1
that the quality distortion to type tA is higher than that to type . Similarly,t1
there is a positive distortion to type tB, even though he or she consumes the
same bundle as type , to whom there is no distortion.t 2
The theory described above applies analogously for an arbitrary number n of
offered qualities. For any n, equation (6) continues to hold, with associated
degradation for all but the highest offered quality . However, when the typeqn
distribution is continuous but the monopolist offers only discrete qualities, the
cut types and , as well as n, the number of offered qualities, are also choicet t1 2
variables. In this paper, while we do not use the monopolist’s optimality con-
ditions for these variables in recovering quality measures, we do briefly analyze
the number of goods offered by firms in the empirical analysis.
Finally, note that it is typical in models of this type to make additional as-
sumptions on the distribution of consumer types to ensure the optimal prices
and qualities are monotonically increasing in types. Because, however, we restrict
our attention to the implications of the model for a discrete number of qualities,
we do not have to do this. Indeed, it could be the case that in some market n
the inverse hazard function of types, , is nonmonotonic in t (as[1 F (t)] /f (t)n n
in Figure 2). If the firm in market n were to offer a fully nonlinear price/quality
schedule in such a case, it would require sophisticated solution techniques in-
volving pooling of types at particular qualities (Wilson 1993). With discrete
qualities, however, pooling obtains regardless of the shape of the type distribution.
For our purposes, it is convenient if the inverse hazard function defined by the
share of households between cut types in each market, the , is monotonic. Thisf
is true for the majority of the markets in our data.7
2.2. Quality Choice and Regulation
In a pair of papers, Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1987, 1988) extend the
Mussa-Rosen model to consider the monopolist’s quality choice problem in the
presence of regulation. They consider three forms of regulation—minimum qual-
ity standards (MQSs), maximum price (price cap) regulation, and rate-of-return
regulation—the first of which is most likely to apply to the cable television
industry in the period we analyze.8 We briefly describe here the consequences
of MQSs for firm behavior and market outcomes in the context of the Mussa-
Rosen model with discrete goods.
Suppose regulation forbids the sale of goods with quality below a given level
. This introduces a set of constraints, , , on the monopolist’s objectiveq q ≥ q Gii
7 If it does not hold, the optimal solution may have pooling of the cut types at a common quality.
We verify this is not the case for each market in the sample.
8 Section 3 discusses in more detail cable regulations in force during the period of this study.
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function given in equation (5). Under our assumptions, these constraints may
bind only for the lowest quality good offered to consumers.
Let l be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the minimum quality con-
straint, , for the lowest offered quality, . Then the monopolist’s first-q ≥ q q1 1
order conditions for qualities (and associated prices) are as above except for
, which is nowq1
1 F1
S (q , t ) lp [v (q , t ) v (q , t )]. (7)q 1 1 q 1 2 q 1 1f1
At the optimum, l is set to ensure that is at least (and is zero if theq q1
unconstrained ). The remaining qualities and prices follow from the un-q 1 q1 1
constrained optimum (with ). As we shall see, this is convenient forq p q1
empirical measurement of the consequences of regulation on quality choice.
3. The Cable Television Industry
Cable television systems bundle television networks into services and offer
these services to households in local (geographically separate) cable markets.9
The largest and most popular services are called basic and expanded basic services
(or tiers) and contain broadcast and (so-called) cable television networks.10 Con-
sumers can also purchase premium services, which are advertising-free enter-
tainment networks typically offering full-length feature films and original pro-
gramming and offered on a stand-alone basis (examples include HBO and
Showtime). To buy any cable services, all households must first purchase basic
service. In practice, the majority also purchase one or more expanded basic and/
or premium services.
There are two dimensions to systems’ choice of service quality: the quality of
the program networks being offered and the allocation of those networks into
service bundles. This paper focuses on the quality of a given set of program
bundles.11 The institutional and economic environment in the industry suggests
that the design of basic and expanded basic services maps well to the theory
9 Most cable television systems now compete with two major direct-broadcast satellite services in
the multichannel video-programming distribution (MVPD) market. Satellite services, however, only
became viable competitors to cable systems with the passage of the Satellite Home Viewer Improve-
ment Act in 1999, which permitted them to distribute local broadcast television signals within local
television markets. The data used in this paper are from 1995, a time when satellite providers had
an aggregate 3.4 percent share of the MVPD market (FCC 2001), with these often drawn from rural
markets where there was no offered cable service. In addition, approximately 1–2 percent of cable
markets have a second wireline cable provider (FCC 2005b, n. 627). None of the systems we consider
are from these so-called overbuilt markets.
10 Broadcast networks are television signals broadcast in the local cable market and then collected
and retransmitted by cable systems. Examples include the major national broadcast networks—ABC,
CBS, NBC, and FOX—as well as public and independent television stations. Cable networks are
advertising-supported general and special-interest networks that are distributed nationally to systems
via satellite, such as MTV, CNN, and ESPN.
11 In related work, Crawford (2004) analyzes the bundling decision in the cable television industry.
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described in Section 2. Since households that buy expanded basic services must
necessarily first purchase basic service, these services are by construction in-
creasing in overall quality. As such, consumer preferences may be adequately
described by a single vertical dimension measuring overall tastes for multichannel
television. Furthermore, since they consist of generally large bundles of individual
networks, the range of qualities possibly chosen is plausibly continuous, but the
offered qualities are clearly discrete. Finally, they are the largest and most im-
portant source of revenue for cable systems (Kagan World Media 2002).
While basic and expanded basic services map well to the theory, systems also
offer premium services. These are not bundled, however, and households can
select among them as long as they purchase at least basic service. As such, they
may be considered a horizontally differentiated set of alternatives to the vertical
sequence of basic and expanded basic services. Unfortunately, solving for the
optimal prices and qualities for products with multiple dimensions of differ-
entiation requires models of multidimensional screening that have proven to be
extremely challenging (Rochet and Stole 2000; Rochet and Chone´ 1998).12 In
the balance of the paper, we therefore focus on measuring quality degradation
for just basic and expanded basic cable television services and note that our
results about quality degradation are conditional on considering the truncated
menu of cable services.
Consumer dissatisfaction with various aspects of cable television services is
common. Fuelling demands for regulatory oversight is the persistent growth in
cable prices over time. Between 1986 and 1991, 1992 and 1996, and 1996 and
2002, respectively, cable prices rose 11.6, 2.2, and 7.1 percent annually, far faster
than rates of price inflation for comparable consumer nondurables in the same
period (GAO 1991; FCC 1997, 2003).13 Of course, the quality of cable services
has also increased. While difficult to quantify directly, the number of cable
networks, expenditure on cable programming, and viewership of cable networks
have all grown substantially over this period (Hazlett and Spitzer 1997). That
being said, the independent American Consumer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) con-
cludes that cable “is one of the worst-performing industries in the ACSI” and
that “people are very dissatisfied” (Consumer Reports 2002, p. 33). Consumers
regularly complain that price increases outstrip quality increases, particularly for
new channels they feel they will not watch (Horn 2001). Many appear to want
“fewer channels [and] lower rates” (Fowler 2000, p. AC5). We present prelim-
inary evidence of quality degradation from the raw data in the next section.
Reflecting these frustrations, cable television service has periodically been sub-
12 Assessing the impact of ignoring premium services is itself a challenge. Rochet and Stole (2002)
suggest that providing households with outside options moderates the monopolist’s incentives to
degrade quality. Premium services, however, are outside options under the monopolist’s control,
which presumably moderates this effect.
13 This is despite price regulations mandating 17 percent price reductions by the 1992 Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C. sec. 533) for the middle
period.
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ject to regulatory oversight. In 1995, the year of our data, two dimensions of
cable service were subject to regulations promulgated by the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (47 U.S.C. sec. 533). The
first required systems to offer a service tier containing at minimum all available
broadcast stations in their market.14 For systems offering a single (basic) service,
this requirement was not binding, as that service already contained these plus
(sometimes many) additional networks. For some systems offering expanded
basic services, however, this requirement served as an MQS. Many systems re-
sponded by introducing new limited basic or lifeline basic services to satisfy the
rule. Beyond this restriction, systems may select and package whatever television
networks they like for sale to households.
The 1992 cable act also introduced price regulations for basic and expanded
basic services. These mandated that cable systems reduce their per-channel basic
and expanded basic prices by 17 percent from September 1992 levels but only
if the local franchise authority certified to regulate rates with the FCC (for basic
services) or consumers submitted complaints to the FCC (for expanded basic
services).15 Because of a combination of factors, including strategic responses by
cable systems, relatively weak cost pass-through (going-forward) requirements,
and generous “social contracts” between regulators and operators, price regu-
lation provided little price relief to households.16 The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 [1996]) subsequently removed even
these price controls on systems. While systems now face little direct regulatory
scrutiny, there remains a constant threat of reregulation, which may itself influ-
ence system behavior (McConnell 2003). In this paper, certification by a local
franchise authority to regulate rates in the early 1990s likely measures not only
the goal of regulating low-quality services but also the presence of active local
concern about cable prices and quality.
3.1. Data
We have compiled a market-level data set on a cross section of U.S. cable
systems to evaluate quality degradation in the industry. The primary source of
data for these systems is Warren Publishing’s Television and Cable Factbook. The
data for this paper consist of the population of cable systems recorded in Warren
14 Among these are included stations that demanded carriage (so-called must-carry stations) as
well as those that negotiated rights for carriage (retransmission consent stations). The former tended
to be smaller independent stations unaffiliated with one of the four major broadcast networks.
15 The 1992 cable act introduced a split regulatory structure, with local franchise authorities given
authority to regulate rates of basic service and federal regulators given authority to regulate rates of
expanded basic services. Franchise authorities wanting to regulate basic service rates were required
to certify with the FCC. See Johnson (1994) and Crandall and Furchtgott-Roth (1996) for more
details about the 1992 cable act.
16 See Hazlett and Spitzer (1997) and Crawford (2000) for more details on the consequences to
cable television prices and qualities of the these regulations.
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(1996) for which complete information was available.17 A sample of 1,042 systems
remained.18
Table 1 presents sample statistics for selected variables from these systems.
Systems in the sample offer at most three basic and expanded basic services.
While all systems offer basic service, 30 percent offer at least one expanded basic,
and 7 percent offer two.19
Cable services contain an increasing set of stations, with the smallest bundles
offering a subset of the stations offered in the larger bundles. For example, for
markets offering three goods, we define a system’s high-quality product to contain
all three basic and expanded basic services, with associated prices and market
shares indexed by the number 3. We similarly define a system’s medium-quality
products, indexed by 2, to contain the first two offered services, and its low-
quality products, indexed by 1, to contain just the first offered service. Products
are defined analogously (that is, from the top) in two- and one-good markets.
In what follows, we order the quality levels in increasing order: .20…q ! ! q4n 3
As can be seen across columns in Table 1, most households purchase all offered
expanded basic services, although there are significant sales of lower quality
services in three-good markets.
Table 1 presents the average number of cable, broadcast, and other channels
offered on each available basic service.21 Aggregating over all basic and expanded
basic services, systems typically offer almost six broadcast networks, more than
17 cable networks, and almost 14 other networks. The top 15 cable programming
networks available in the United States in 1998 are listed in Table 2.
3.2. Measuring Cable Service Quality
Measuring service quality is notoriously difficult in the cable television in-
dustry. Much of the recent empirical literature measures quality by the number
17 While there are over 11,000 systems in the sample, persistence in nonresponse over time as well
as incomplete reporting of critical variables required imposing a large number of conditions in order
for a system to be included in each sample. Missing information on prices, quantities, and reporting
dates were responsible for the majority of the exclusions. See Crawford (2000) for more information
about the sampling procedure.
18 We also excluded 122 observations for which our procedure recovered qualities that were non-
monotonic in types. This was largely driven by very small market shares (some less than .1 percent)
for low-quality goods, which violated the assumption of an increasing hazard function required by
the theory. It is likely that such services represented a compromise between systems and regulators
seeking services affordable to low-income households. As this is outside the scope of our model, we
dropped these systems from the analysis.
19 Designations for expanded services have little meaning. The data report expanded services in
the order input by systems. In practice, Expanded Basic I tends to have more programming, a higher
price, and a higher market share than Expanded Basic II.
20 Because the theory implies no distortion at the top, it is convenient to adopt this indexing
convention over the alternative .…q ! ! q1 n
21 Note that reported cable networks is the number of networks among the top 40 most popular
as of 1998 (top-40 networks), reported broadcast networks are offered only on the lowest quality
(basic) service, and other networks are public, educational, and government channels and other cable
networks outside the top 40.
Table 1
Sample Statistics: Selected Characteristics
Variable
All
Markets
Three-Good
Markets
Two-Good
Markets
One-Good
Markets
Expanded basic services:
Any .30 1.00 1.00 .00
One .23 .00 1.00 .00
Two .07 1.00 .00 .00
Market shares:
w3 .66 .47 .61 .70
w2 .06
a .12 .04 . . .
w1 .04
a .04 . . . . . .
Prices:
p3 20.40 25.64 22.69 19.13
p2 14.32
a 21.86 12.05 . . .
p1 16.78
a 16.78 . . . . . .
Programming:
Top 40 cable networks:
On service 3 16.55 22.29 20.85 14.57
On service 2 9.14a 18.15 6.44 . . .
On service 1 11.94a 11.94 . . . . . .
Broadcast networks:
Over the air 2.54 3.19 2.85 2.37
On cable 5.74 6.57 6.51 5.40
Other networks on basic 14.36 10.85 13.18 15.09
System characteristics:
Homes passed (1,000s) 5.11 9.54 12.19 2.34
Channel capacity 38.87 43.21 43.55 36.91
Market characteristics:
Income:
Mean 28.83 28.27 30.11 30.15
Standard deviation 24.61 24.15 25.52 26.21
Skew 2.69 2.70 2.64 2.68
Age:
Mean 36.22 36.36 35.75 36.34
Standard deviation 23.20 23.36 22.74 23.03
Skew .16 .15 .18 .15
Household size:
Mean 2.67 2.66 2.67 2.65
Standard deviation 1.60 1.61 1.59 1.61
Skew 1.78 1.76 1.81 1.92
Rural share .63 .66 .56 .55
Certification .12 .36 .15 .08
N 1,042 72 240 730
Note. Data on cable systems, including service, market share, price, and programming data, are from
Warren Publishing (1996). Prices are in 1995 dollars. Data on demographic information are from the U.S.
Census Bureau (1994). Certification is a dummy variable that indicates the local franchise authority registered
with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate basic cable rates as of April 1996. Data
on certification are from the Cable Services Bureau, FCC, April 1996.
a Averaged over markets offering this service.
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Table 2
Top 15 Cable Programming Networks
Rank Network Subscribers (millions) Programming Format
1 TBS Superstation 77.0 General interest
2 Discovery Channel 76.4 Nature
3 ESPN 76.2 Sports
4 USA Network 75.8 General interest
5 C-SPAN 75.7 Public affairs
6 TNT 75.6 General interest
7 FOX Family Channel 74.0 General interest/kids
8 TNN (The Nashville Network) 74.0 General interest/country
9 Lifetime Television 73.4 Women’s
10 CNN (Cable News Network) 73.0 News
11 A&E 73.0 General interest
12 The Weather Channel 72.0 Weather
13 QVC 70.1 Home shopping
14 The Learning Channel (TLC) 70.0 Science
15 MTV: Music Television 69.4 Music
Note. Data on network subscribers are from National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Top 20
Cable Programming Networks—as of December 2006 (http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx
?contentIDp74). Data on programming formats from individual network promotional material are from
National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Cable Networks (http://www.ncta.com/Organiza-
tions.aspx?typeporgtyp2&contentIDp2907) or industry sources.
of channels offered on each service (Mayo and Otsuka 1991; Rubinovitz 1993;
Hazlett and Spitzer 1997). While this can be dangerous—it assumes all cable
networks are of equal underlying quality—it is a useful summary measure that
we can use to look for evidence of quality degradation in our raw data.
Table 3 reports the average price paid per channel for each offered cable service
in three- and two-good cable markets.22 Channels included in the calculations
are all the major broadcast networks and the top 40 satellite networks as of
1998. Under the assumption that each channel is of the same underlying quality,
quality degradation would be reflected in higher per-channel prices for low- and
medium-quality services.
The results suggest moderate quality distortion in low- and medium-quality
cable services. Table 3 reports results using the total of prices and channels for
each offered services. In three-good markets, on average across markets, the price
per channel rises modestly from the highest to lowest quality service. Despite
these seemingly small differences, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal
prices per channel across services at conventional significance levels. In two-
good markets, the results are even stronger. The price per channel of the high-
quality service is less than two-thirds of the low-quality service, a very large (and
statistically significant) difference.
While these results are suggestive, elsewhere we find that the identities of
offered channels are very important in describing cable service quality and de-
22 Recall the Mussa-Rosen model predicts no quality degradation in one-good markets. For ref-
erence, the average price per channel in these markets is $1.38.
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Table 3
Preliminary Evidence of Quality Degradation
Total Prices/Channels
Three-Good
Markets
Two-Good
Markets
Mean Difference Mean Difference
/channelp3 1.06 (.03) .04 (.01) 1.10 (.03) .61 (.06)
/channelp2 1.10 (.03) .13 (.02) 1.72 (.07) . . .
/channelp1 1.23 (.04) . . .
N 72 239
Note. Reported are the average price per channel for each offered cable service. Channels include all top
40 satellite channels and, for the lowest quality service, all major broadcast networks. Ratios are formed
with total price and total channels. Values in the Difference columns are the difference in price per channel
in that row and the row that follows. The cable system in one two-good market included no satellite or
broadcast networks in its lowest quality service. Standard errors are in parentheses.
mand (Crawford 2000).23 As such, in this paper, we directly measure cable service
quality by exploiting the restrictions of a theoretical model of optimal price and
quality choice to recover quality measures consistent with the observed prices
and market shares. We then relate these to the networks available to determine
the incremental quality offered by each. In addition to controlling for hetero-
geneity in network quality, we can exploit this model to directly measure quality
degradation by systems. These procedures are described in further detail in the
following sections.
4. Empirical Model and Algorithm for Measuring Quality
4.1. Empirical Model
Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), we assume that utility for a consumer of
type t is linear in quality,
u(q , t)p tq  p, (8)i i
and costs to the firm are quadratic in quality,
1
2C(q )p q . (9)i i2
Given these assumptions, total surplus from a consumer of type t is S(q ,i
. In this specification, t measures consumer willingness to pay2t){ tq  .5qi i
(WTP) for quality net of firm’s marginal cost for quality.24 For convenience, we
23 For example, we find mean WTP for popular channels like ESPN and Nickelodeon up to 10
times as great as that for channels like the Discovery Channel and MTV.
24 In other words, for this specification, preference levels cannot be separately identified from
marginal cost levels. This is a typical problem in the empirical analysis of product markets (Bresnahan
1989). This is not a great concern in this paper, as we focus on observable outcomes (prices, qualities,
and market shares) that are invariant to the composition of t. It would matter, however, in calculating
the profit and welfare consequences of observable price/quality schedules and/or associated regulatory
interventions.
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refer to the type parameter, t, as net WTP. This specification is also convenient
because the socially optimal quality for any type t is given by , whichS (q , t)p 0q i
implies . Therefore, given measures of cut types and qualities , oneq**p t t qi ii
can immediately measure the extent of quality distortion (for the cut type) as
the difference .(t  q )ii
The Mussa-Rosen assumptions are convenient as they yield closed-form so-
lutions for optimal qualities and prices as a function of these net types. They
are also fairly restrictive, however, particularly in the assumption of quadratic
costs of providing quality. We justify them on two grounds. First, they accurately
reflect the nature of costs in the industry. The primary marginal quantity (unit)
cost to cable systems are the per-subscriber monthly affiliate fees paid to networks
for carrying their programming. Offering a service that is higher in quality means
offering more and/or better cable networks, at increasing unit cost. Furthermore,
the most valuable (highest quality) networks tend to have more bargaining power
with cable systems, which suggests that costs are convex in quality.25 Regardless,
as the curvature of the cost function is important for determining quality deg-
radation in the Mussa-Rosen model, in the Appendix we evaluate the sensitivity
of our conclusions to our assumptions on its shape.
The second justification for our assumptions is that they allow us considerable
flexibility in estimating the distribution of net preferences across markets. In
particular, we treat each cable market in isolation and recover the distribution
of types in that market consistent with observed market shares and prices. Given
that we observe only a fixed number of bundles n being offered in any given
market, it is clear that we would not be able to identify (nonparametrically) any
continuous-type distribution completely but rather only the indifferent consum-
ers and the corresponding percentiles .26 Such flex-t , . . . , t f , . . . , f4n 3 4n 3
ibility is important, however, as it is variation in the distribution of tastes across
markets that drives differences in offered qualities.27
4.2. Recovering Implied Qualities
Our basic strategy is to recover values for the net type distribution from
observed prices and market shares in each market. The estimating equations are
derived from the Mussa-Rosen model of optimal quality choice. As such, once
25 Indeed, a graph of affiliate fees for the 40 top cable networks in 1995 is clearly convex (Kagan
World Media 2004).
26 For these reasons, we do not exploit the model to predict the optimal number of services to
offer. To do so would require simulating the profit associated with other offered qualities. This in
turn requires information about the type distribution between the recovered cut types. We do,
however, ensure that for the type that we recover, it would not be more profitable for the monopolist
to offer fewer services (by pooling over types).
27 In ongoing work (Crawford and Shum 2005) using more recent data, we allow preferences to
be continuously distributed within markets and pool information across markets to flexibly estimate
features of those distributions. Preliminary results from the model in that paper applied to the data
in this paper yield results qualitatively similar to those presented here.
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we have the type distribution, it is a simple matter to calculate the offered qualities
implied by the model.
As described earlier, we recover parameters separately for each market. In each
market c, the unknown parameters are the cut types in the distribution of net
consumer preferences, , and the associated mass between these types, , fort fic ic
and . Letip 4 n, . . . , 3 cp 1, . . . , C v { {f , t ; ip 4c ic ic
describe the vector of parameters in market c. There are pa-n , . . . , 3} 2nc c
rameters per market, where is the number of services offered by the systemnc
in market c. Importantly, we allow the parameters to vary across markets c,vc
which allows the distribution of consumer types t to differ across cities.
The available data in each market consist of market shares and prices of the
bundles . In three-good markets, we have sixn {s , p ; ip 4 n, . . . , 3}c ic ic
parameters and six observed variables; in two-good markets, we have four pa-
rameters and four variables; and so on. Thus the economic model is just identified
in each market. For convenience, in the description to follow, we omit the market
subscript c.
For each market, the parameters can be immediatelyf ; ip 4 n, . . . , 3i
recovered from the observed market shares as
s p f , ip 4 n, . . . , 3, (10)i i
so that the market share of the outside good is given by . In
3
s p 1 f0 iip4n
order to solve for the n cut types , we note that the prices aret , ip 4 n, 3i
characterized as
p p v(q , t ) u (q )p t q  u (q ), (11)i i i i i i ii i
where is endogenously determined by the firm. Given knowledge of usingq fi i
equation (10) above, the (unknown) quality levels are given by the first-orderqi
conditions given in equation (6):
t if ip n;1 Fn iq p (12)i t  Dt otherwise,i i{ fi
where and . Moreover, the associated utility levels for
i
F p  f Dt { t  ti i i i1 iip0
the cut types, , areu , ip 4 n, . . . , 3i
u { u(q , wt )p u(q , t ),i i1i i i
p u(q , t ) u(q , t ) u(q , t ),
(13)
i1 i1 i1i1 i i1
p u(q , t ) Dt q p . . . pi1 i1i1 i1
i1 i1
p u(q , t ) Dt q p Dt q ,′ ′′ ′ 1 i i1 i i′ ′ip1 ip1
where the final equality obtains from the indifferent condition for cut type ,t1
which is .u(q , t )p 01 1
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By plugging equation (12) into equation (13), and then substituting the im-
plied forms of and into the price equations (11), we obtain a system of nq ui i
nonlinear equations that can be solved for the n unknowns .t , ip 4 n, 3i
Note that since our values of are just transformations of thef , t , ip 4 n, 3i i
observed data (albeit very nonlinear ones in the case of the ’s), there are noti
standard errors for these measures.28
The intuition for how we recover implied qualities from the data may be
described by a simple example. Consider a market with two offered qualities.
In this market, we observe three market shares (including that of the outside
good), , , and , and two prices, and . From these, we wish to recovers s s p p0 1 2 1 2
information about the net type distribution, a discrete distribution with three
points of support characterized by five parameters, , , , , and .29 Ourf f f t t0 1 2 1 2
procedure asks, What five values for the net type distribution in this market can
rationalize the five observed data points under the Mussa-Rosen model? Once
we have answered that question and obtained the net type distribution, the theory
permits us to calculate the implied qualities for each product in the market. We
then repeat this process for each market.
From equation (10), the share of people purchasing each product exactly
identifies the share of each type within the market, . The challenge is inf p sii
recovering the cut types and . These are obtained from observed prices usingt t1 2
the quality first-order conditions in equation (12) and pricing equation (11) as
follows. For our two-good example, optimal qualities and prices as a function
of the net type distribution are given by
2q p t , p p t  Dtq ,2 2 12 2
1 F1
q p t  Dt, p p t q .
(14)
1 1 11 1f1
If the cable system was a perfectly discriminating monopolist, there would be
no quality distortion, and solving for the cut types under our modeling as-
sumptions would be trivial: and for each . Each2q p t p p t q p t i  {1, 2}i i ii i i
cut type would then be given by the square root of its observed price, t pi
.pi
There is not, unfortunately, an intuitive representation of this solution for the
case of quality degradation described by equation (14). Instead, we provide two
illustrative examples. Consider first two markets that have similar prices and
shares of consumers who buy either service ( ) but differ in the relativef  f1 2
28 In this sense, our empirical procedure resembles the first step in Berry’s (1994) procedure, in
which mean quality levels for each brand are recovered as a function of market shares, and in
Miravete and Ro¨ller (2003), in which the parameters of optimal nonlinear tariffs are recovered as a
function of the slope and curvature of observed tariff functions.
29 We cannot technically estimate the boundaries of the support of the type distribution, but we
do not need these to calculate implied qualities.
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weights of and . Table 4 provides an example from the data of two suchf f1 2
markets. In the high- market (Kamas), there are more people with tastes forf1
the low-quality good , which reduces the monopolist’s incentive to degradeq1
its quality. In general, this would also induce the monopolist to increase andp1
decrease . Since prices are similar in both markets, however, the higher inp q2 1
the high- market must be rationalized by lower (from the equation for )f t p11 1
and higher (from the equation for ).t p22
Similarly, consider the two markets in Table 4 with similar market shares and
low-quality price that differ in the high-quality price . In this example, evenp p1 2
if the number of each type is similar, that is, the ’s are similar, the higher inf p2
Belleville suggests a greater WTP for the high-quality good, , among householdst 2
there. By making high types more profitable to the monopolist, this would have
the tendency to increase degradation in and lower . Since is similar inq p p1 1 1
each market, however, it must be that is also higher in the high- markett p1 2
(although is indeed lower).q1
These examples both show that the primary challenge in our procedure is to
separate the impact of WTP for quality across markets, ’s, from offered qualitiest
that are themselves determined by those preferences, ’s. The theory providesq(t)
the solution: cut types in each market are found that can simultaneously satisfy
the monopolists’ optimal choice of quality as well as yield prices equal to those
observed in the data.
This paper differs from the recent empirical literature analyzing quality choice
in several respects. First, the majority of the existing literature focuses on prices
and not quality. For example, Verboven (2002), Cohen (2001), and Clerides
(2002) compare prices (or markups) for various qualities of cars, paper towels,
and books, respectively, to see if there is evidence of price discrimination by
quality. Similarly, Leslie (2004) simulates alternative pricing policies for different
(but fixed) qualities of a Broadway show. Closest in spirit to our paper is the
recent work by McManus (forthcoming), which compares estimated marginal
benefits and observed marginal costs of quality variants in specialty coffees and
finds evidence of degradation for low-quality variants. We differ, however, in
that he tests the implications of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model, whereas
we take it as a maintained assumption to analyze its implications for offered
qualities.30
Our work is much closer in spirit to (and motivated by) the large recent
literature on differentiated product demand estimation using discrete choice
random coefficient models of consumer choices (Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes 1995). In that literature, the distribution of consumers’ WTP for
(multiple) characteristics is identified by variation in market shares across prod-
ucts and markets. While identified by the demand side alone, some authors also
30 Methodologically, this approach is most closely related to recent literature applying principal-
agent models of adverse selection to other problems like nonlinear price quantity schedules (Bousquet
and Ivaldi 1997; Miravete 2002; Miravete and Roller 2003) and informational asymmetries in the
design of regulatory mechanisms (Wolak 1994).
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incorporate the implications of Bertrand-Nash pricing on markups to enhance
the precision of estimates of consumer preferences (for example, Bresnahan 1987;
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995). In our framework, we use the implications
of optimal pricing and optimal quality choice to identify the distribution of
consumers’ WTP for characteristics, albeit for only a single dimension of dif-
ferentiation (quality). Our basic idea, however, is that there is important infor-
mation in the variation in characteristics across markets that informs the shape
of the distribution of preferences for those characteristics.
There are two important limitations, however, to our approach. The first is
that qualities and preferences for quality exactly solve each firm’s qualityq tc c
choice problem in market c without error. In essence, this introduces as many
parameters as observations in the data, which makes our calculations of net
preferences across markets mere transformations of the data rather than statistical
estimates.31 We could relax this restriction, however, by pooling information
across markets. It is more realistic in this case to estimate a continuous distri-
bution of WTP for quality that is common across markets (conditional on
covariates) as well as for the offered quality in each. We could also relax some
of the strong assumptions on the structure of preferences and costs, and the
identification requirements would be similar to those for the demand estimation
literature. The disadvantage of this approach is that the computational burden
is significantly larger. Not only must each firm’s quality choice problem be solved
for each market at each iteration in the econometric estimation, but the tech-
niques required to do so for continuous distributions of tastes are generally more
challenging than those used here. We undertake this task in Crawford and Shum
(2005).
The second limitation is that the methods developed here are suited to a
monopolist facing a single dimension of differentiation. We think the extension
of these techniques to competition with quality choice and multiple dimensions
of differentiation is quite promising, however, and discuss this in greater detail
in Section 6.
5. Results
5.1. Type Parameters, Quality, and Quality Degradation
The results of our empirical procedure yield vectors of fundamental demand
parameters: ; for each marketv { {f , t ; ip 4 n, . . . , 3} cp 1, . . . ,c ic ic
. Table 5 reports the net type distributions, ( ), for markets offering one,C f , ti i
two, and three goods. By construction, the share of the distribution of consumer
types that purchase each good, , matches exactly the corresponding averagefi
31 Our approach provides an interesting contrast to the differentiated product demand literature
in this regard. While those product demand studies also solve for each product’s quality (mean
utility) in each market, they restrict the distribution of consumers’ preferences to be the same across
markets.
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Table 5
Recovered Parameter Values and Implied Qualities
Variable Three-Good Markets Two-Good Markets One-Good Markets
Net type distribution:
f3 .47 .61 .70
f2 .12 .04 . . .
f1 .04 . . . . . .
f0 .37 .35 .30
t3 5.15 4.77 4.35
t2 4.99 4.65 . . .
t1 4.90 . . . . . .
Qualities:
q3 5.15 4.77 4.35
q2 4.43 2.57 . . .
q1 3.42 . . . . . .
% Degradation:
(t  q )/t33 3 .00 .00 .00
(t  q )/t22 2 .11 .45 . . .
(t  q )/t11 1 .30 . . . . . .
Price/quality ratio
q /p3 3 .20 .21 .23
q /p2 2 .21 .21 . . .
q /p1 1 .21 . . . . . .
N 72 240 730
Note. Parameters of net type distribution are obtained using the procedure in Section 4.2. Quality measures
are calculated using equation (12). Percentage of degradation evaluated at cut types is defined as the
marginal type just inclined to purchase that quality.
market share from Table 1. The WTP for the cut types, those consumers just
willing to purchase each of the offered goods, , varies across products but isti
on the order of $4–$5 (in 1995 dollars) per unit of quality. There is also variation
in the type distribution across systems offering different numbers of goods, with
markets offering more goods being populated by households with greater tastes
for cable service quality.32
5.1.1. Quality Degradation in the Cable Television Industry
The results presented in Table 5 and equation (12) permit us to calculate the
implied quality of each offered cable service in each market. There is significant
quality degradation in cable markets: offered qualities for medium- and low-
quality goods are at least 11.1 percent and 30.3 percent less in three-good markets
and 44.7 percent less in two-good markets than what would be provided in a
competitive market offering the same number of goods.33 The larger value for
32 This is an interesting result, as it confirms a primary testable implication of the Mussa and
Rosen (1978) model.
33 One cannot say more than that because a competitive market may not offer as many goods as
would the monopolist (Spence 1975). Evaluating the welfare effects of imperfect competition on the
qualities offered consumers would have to take that into account.
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two-good markets is consistent with the evidence from the raw data described
in Table 3.
Two factors shape our interpretation of these findings, however. First, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, because we calculate the quality degradation for the lowest
consumer type to purchase each good, if we have accurately specified the shape
of the quality cost function, these measures are a lower bound on the actual
degradation facing consumers. Calculating a measure of the quality degradation
to the average consumer is difficult, however, without more information (or
assumptions) about the distribution of consumer types.34 Second, limiting our
ability to draw strong conclusions about quality degradation is the fact that our
estimates are quite sensitive to assumptions about the curvature of the cost
function used in the estimation. The Appendix describes this issue in more detail;
we simply note here that while all of our results that follow are quite robust to
assumptions on cost, the estimated quality degradation is not. In Crawford and
Shum (2005), we generalize the empirical model used here to identify the shape
of preferences and costs and draw stronger conclusions about quality degradation
in cable markets.
5.1.2. Interpreting Quality Levels
From Table 5, the average qualities vary from a low of 2.57 to a high of 5.23
units across products and markets. To assist in the interpretation of these mag-
nitudes, Table 6 presents a simple regression of implied qualities on the char-
acteristics of the cable services whose quality they measure. Since cable services
are bundles of programming networks, this amounts to the following regression:
′q*p b X   , Gi, c, (15)ic ic ic
where are the indicators of the programming offered on service i in marketXic
c and measures market-product deviations from the expected quality givenic
. Included in this specification are dummy variables for the top 15 networksXic
(compare Table 2), additional cable networks, and measures of broadcast network
availability. If the choice of networks offered on service i, , depends on pref-Xic
erences for quality but not on idiosyncratic tastes for networks, the coefficient
34 A very crude measure of the quality degradation to the average consumer may be obtained by
assuming a uniform (within products) distribution of types and particular values (or a range of
values) for the upper bound of the type distribution. If we calculate a range of upper bounds by
assuming the density of consumers above the highest cut type ranges from the low to the high of
the three values available for the density of consumers purchasing low- and medium-quality goods
in two- and three-good markets, we find an upper bound of between 5.90 and 8.77 in three-good
markets, 5.64 and 9.50 in two-good markets, and 5.36 and 9.77 in one-good markets. The implied
quality degradation to the average consumer is then 29.6 percent, 12.1 percent, and 5.9–25.2 percent
in three-good markets; 47.6 percent and 8.3–33.1 percent in two-good markets; and 10.1–38.3 percent
in one-good markets. While capable only of a broad range of values, these average effects suggest
nonnegligible quality degradation throughout the cable product line.
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Table 6
Interpreting Quality Measures
Variable Estimate Implied Mean WTP ($)
WTBS .53 (.03) 2.39
Discovery .16 (.04) .73
ESPN .94 (.04) 4.22
USA .33 (.03) 1.49
CSPAN .08 (.03) .34
TNT .13 (.04) .59
Family .47 (.03) 2.13
Nashville .31 (.03) 1.38
Lifetime .02 (.03) .09
CNN .21 (.03) .94
A&E .22 (.03) 1.01
Weather .02 (.03) .10
QVC .57 (.04) 2.57
Learning .15 (.04) .67
MTV .08 (.03) .37
Other networks .04 (.00) .18
Note. Coefficient estimates from regression of recovered quality levels on
broadcast and cable programming variables. Reported are results for the top
15 cable networks listed in Table 2. The results are pooled across all markets
and across all bundles within a market. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The second column is from the authors’ calculations; the estimated willingness
to pay (WTP) is the product of the regression coefficient in the first column
with the average (across all markets) estimated WTP for quality of the con-
sumer just willing to purchase the high-quality bundle; .t p 4.523
estimates can be interpreted as the causal effects of inclusion of each network
on overall service quality.35
The first column of Table 6 presents the results of this regression.36 The
interpretation of the coefficient on ESPN, for example, is that adding ESPN to
a cable service is estimated to increase the quality of that service by .94 “utils.”
The second column of Table 6 transforms this effect into the WTP for the average
consumer just willing to purchase the high-quality good, that is, the average
across markets. This equals 4.51 and implies an average WTP for this consumert 3
type for ESPN of $4.22. The resulting estimates are generally reasonable in sign
and magnitude: 12 of 15 are positive and significant, ranging from $.34 to $4.22.37
These are consistent with (and indeed more reasonable than) previous results
reported by Crawford (2000). This suggests that our empirical procedure is
recovering accurate measures of preferences and qualities: higher quality cable
services are those with more (and more popular) cable networks.
Figure 3 orders the recovered quality measures and illustrates the results graph-
ically. It also facilitates the interpretation of our measures of total quality and
35 This assumption will be satisfied if consumers agree on an average across markets on a preference
ordering for networks (for example, TNT, USA, Nickelodeon, ESPN, and so on).
36 For simplicity, we present here results pooling observations across both markets and services.
37 Recall that we recover net preferences, which are defined as WTP for quality less its marginal
cost. As such, the reported estimates are lower bounds on the true underlying WTP.
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Figure 3. Recovered quality levels for top-networks results from Table 6
quality degradation presented earlier. To see this, compare Figure 3 with Figure
4, which illustrates the quality degradation results from Table 5. In particular,
the regression results illustrated in Figure 3 translate the raw quality values into
comparable bundles of cable networks. For example, the average quality of a
low-quality good in a three-good market (3.52) is slightly less desirable than a
service incorporating the 10 highest quality cable networks, as estimated in Table
6 (3.89).38 It also translates the degree of degradation into comparable bundles
of networks. For example, the average degradation of medium-quality goods in
three-good markets is .54, or about the value of a single high-quality cable
network like TBS or the Family Channel. At the other extreme, the average
degradation for a low-quality good in a two-good market is 2.2, or a little less
than the combined value of TBS, the Family Channel, USA, the Nashville Net-
work, A&E, CNN, and the Discovery Channel.
5.2. Cable Quality and the Benefits of Regulation
As described in Section 2.2, Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1987, 1988)
address the impact of various forms of regulation on quality offerings of a
discriminating monopolist. Most relevant for our purposes are MQSs, as they
were the component of the regulations imposed by the 1992 cable act that are
38 This should not strike the reader as high, as even low-quality cable services in three-good markets
have on average 6.5 local broadcast networks (average qualityp 1.04), almost 11 “other networks”
(average quality p .00), and almost 12 top-40 cable networks.
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Figure 4. Quality and quality degradation by market results from Table 5
most likely to be binding in the period we study.39 Besanko, Donnenfeld, and
White find that MQSs raise the monopolist’s nonlinear tariff from below, in-
creasing quality and prices for low-quality goods, lowering prices, and leaving
quality unchanged for high-quality goods.40
To measure these effects, we consider reduced-form regressions of these fea-
tures of cable services on characteristics of cable systems and the markets they
serve. A number of variables were considered; Tables 7 and 8 present a summary
of the most relevant results.41
5.2.1. Quality and Its Degradation
We begin by regressing recovered service qualities on a set of core system
characteristics, market characteristics, and regulatory characteristics. Homes
39 By contrast, price caps, while the centerpiece of the regulations imposed by the 1992 cable act,
were by 1995 largely nonbinding. See Section 3.
40 The minimum-quality standard reduces the ability to distort quality downward to the low type
in order to extract rents from high types. As a result, the low quality is increased (increasing its
price). This makes the low-quality good more attractive to high types, which requires the monopolist
to lower its price for that good. Note that while prices to low types rise (because of the higher
quality), their surplus (and total surplus) generally increases.
41 Variables other than the ones presented in the table but also considered included measures of
system age, presence of fiber-optic cable, other demographic characteristics, and the degree of ur-
banization in the market. Including these variables did not change the qualitative findings presented
here.
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passed and channel capacity were the included system characteristics. Homes
passed measures the set of households for which cable service is available in a
cable market; it is a measure of local market size. This could be important, as
systems in larger markets may have greater incentives to invest in higher quality
services.42 Channel capacity measures the capacity of a system’s technical infra-
structure. Since more networks necessarily implies higher quality service, having
larger channel capacity prevents capacity limitations that could hold down offered
service qualities.
Features of the distribution of households within markets were the included
market characteristics. To the extent household characteristics are correlated with
WTP for cable service quality, the Mussa-Rosen theory has strong implications
for the relationship between offered qualities and features of the distribution of
these characteristics.43 The household characteristics included were income, age,
and household size. Income was included because heterogeneity in WTP is often
thought to be driven by heterogeneity in income. Age and household size were
included because demand for cable services is known to vary in important ways
with these household characteristics.
We faced a challenge, however, in parsimoniously characterizing the impact
of the distribution of household characteristics on our quality measures. After
considering a number of alternative specifications, we present results including
the mean and skew of household income, the mean and variance of household
age, and the mean and skew of household size. In all cases, we included the
mean to capture the impact of increases in the location of the distribution on
quality. We include the skew of income because increases in skew (controlling
for the mean) induce a mean-preserving rightward shift in the distribution of
income. If income is correlated with WTP for quality, this will increase incentives
for quality degradation to low-quality goods. We include the skew of household
size for similar reasons. We include the variance of age because there appeared
to be a significant nonmonotonicity in the relationship between age distributions
and qualities. Markets with relatively high shares of young people and markets
with relatively high shares of old people appeared to have impacts similar to
each other and different from markets with typical shares of these ages. Increasing
the variance of the age distribution (controlling for the mean) induces a mean-
preserving shift of the age distribution within markets into the tails.
Finally, certification to regulate prices of basic cable services served as our
measure of the degree of local regulatory oversight in a system’s market area.
As described in Section 3.1, it measures whether the local regulatory authority
had certified with the FCC to regulate the lowest quality cable service offered
in the market, as permitted by the 1992 cable act, at the time the data were
sampled.
The first column of Table 7 presents the estimated relationship between these
42 This phenomenon is common in media markets (Owen and Wildman 1992).
43 We thank a referee for suggesting these specifications.
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factors and service quality. This first column pools the data across all products
within markets and is meant to illuminate the broad patterns we find in our
results. As expected, systems with larger market areas and greater channel capacity
offer higher quality cable services. Household characteristics had very interesting
impacts on offered qualities. While mean income was not estimated to influence
offered qualities, increases in the skew of income tended to decrease them. Mean
age was estimated to have a small positive effect on qualities, but increases in
the skewness of income had a large negative effect, perhaps because of a relative
lack of viewing options suitable to young or old viewers. Increases in both mean
household size and share of large households controlling for mean size increased
offered qualities. Finally, cable service quality is significantly larger (.52 units,
equal to a top-three cable network) in markets with local regulatory oversight.
The second and third columns of Table 7 provide further insights into the
relationship between market and regulatory characteristics on offered cable ser-
vice quality. Of the market characteristics, the results for income are the most
interesting. While the pooled results suggest that markets with more high-income
households (controlling for mean income) are offered lower quality services,
decomposing the effects between high- versus low- and medium-quality services
shows that this effect persists only (and is much stronger) for the latter. This is
exactly as predicted by the theory and suggests that the distribution of household
incomes within markets is closely related to WTP for service quality.
We get similar differences in effects between service qualities for regulatory
characteristics. While the pooled results in the first column suggest a strong
positive relation across all services, decomposing the effect between high- versus
low- and medium-quality services (if offered) yields a much stronger association
at the low end of the quality spectrum. For example, the quality of the high-
quality services is higher by .15, or 3.3 percent of the average quality of high-
quality goods, in markets with local regulatory oversight. Moreover, low- and
medium-quality services are higher by .71, or 24.4 percent of the average quality
of such goods.
What of the impact of regulation on quality degradation? We consider two
measures. The first is our measure of quality degradation for the existing low-
and medium-quality services that are presented in Table 5. Recall, however, that
the presence of low-quality services limits the ability of the monopolist to extract
rents on high-quality services. It is therefore in the firm’s interest to offer low-
quality services only if the profit earned from the households that buy them
more than offsets the lost profits on high-quality purchasers. Another measure
then of service degradation is the absence of low- and medium-quality services.
The first and second columns of Table 8 present reduced-form regressions of
these measures of quality degradation on system, market, and regulatory char-
acteristics. System variables like homes passed and channel capacity have com-
peting effects across specifications: they appear to increase degradation where
low- and medium-quality services are offered but also increase the likelihood of
offering such services. Market characteristics have effects consistent with the
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quality regulations described above. Increases in the skew of income (weakly)
increase quality degradation and reduce the number of offered services, while
increases (decreases) in the skew (variance) of household size (age) reduce quality
degradation and increase the number of offered services. Local regulatory cer-
tification, however, has a strong positive association: quality degradation is lower
by .093, or an estimated 24.1 percent of the average degradation, in certified
markets, and the number of services offered is higher by .344, or 25.1 percent
of the average number of services.
5.2.2. Endogenous Regulation
A potential problem with these results is that regulation is unlikely to be
exogenous to a system’s choice of service quality. It is more likely that franchise
areas choose to regulate cable systems where offered quality is low. While any
such relationship would likely bias downward the estimated impact of regulation
on service quality, we acknowledge the potential problem and address it by
instrumenting for the certification variable in the regressions.
We consider a number of potential instruments based on likely determinants
of the decision to regulate cable service. These are based on the idea that house-
holds (through their representatives in local government) make the decision to
regulate their local cable television service on the basis of typical factors associated
with political decisions. Features of cable service are surely important deter-
minants of the demand for cable regulation but are poor choices for instruments,
as they are likely to be correlated with unobserved elements of cable service
quality. Instead, we focus on the costs associated with regulation.
As many have argued since Olson (1965), the harder government regulations
are to implement, the more difficult it is to inform and organize the local
population. We proxy for these costs with the share of a county’s population
that lives in rural areas.44 This measures the extent to which the population in
a county is dispersed away from its population center. The greater this dispersion,
the more difficult it is likely to be to organize an effective regulatory regime.45
Consistent with these beliefs, first-stage regressions uniformly show a strong and
statistically significant negative association between rural population share and
certification to regulate.46
The remaining columns of Table 7 duplicate the analysis of regulation on
service quality using the rural population share as an instrument for the decision
of a local franchise area to certify to regulate cable television services. As expected,
instrumenting for the regulation decision increases the estimated impact of reg-
44 Most cable franchise areas encompass one or a few counties. We focus on the largest county
served by the system.
45 A referee notes that the rural population share can also be justified as an instrument if rural
populations simply have lower tastes for regulation in general.
46 We also considered as cost-side instruments the size of the primary county and the share of the
population in that county that rents, but these had less power and tended to produce very imprecise
results.
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ulation on service quality. As shown earlier, this effect is concentrated on low-
and medium-quality services: now just a 20 percent increase in the likelihood
of being regulated results in an estimated increase of 1.56, or 53.8 percent, in
the quality of these goods. Instrumenting also, however, greatly reduces the
precision of our estimated effects, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that
regulation has no effect.
The qualitative effect of instrumenting for certification in the analysis of quality
degradation in Table 8 is similar to that for service quality levels: the estimated
effect of certification becomes larger (in absolute value) but less precise. In what
follows we therefore focus on the ordinary least squares results and take these
as a lower bound of the true effects of regulation. For reference, Table A1 presents
the corresponding instrumental variables results.
5.2.3. Quality, Prices, and Regulation
Our results so far demonstrate that local regulatory oversight is consistently
associated with more and higher quality services with less degradation to con-
sumers. These are strong results for an industry for which regulation has recently
been considered an ineffective counter to the cable system’s market power. Is
cable regulation then beneficial to consumers? Does it translate into consumer
welfare benefits? While we cannot answer this question directly, we present here
what our results suggest about this important public policy issue.
To test these implications, we ran reduced-form regressions of cable prices
and quality/price ratios on the same characteristics of cable systems and the
markets they serve. Table 8 presents the results. Several interesting patterns
emerge. First, prices are demonstrated to be higher in markets subject to local
regulatory oversight, with a higher certification coefficient for low- and medium-
quality goods (3.547) relative to high-quality goods (1.177). As their nominal
purpose was to reduce prices, this has been taken as evidence that the regulations
imposed by the 1992 cable act did not work (Crawford 2000; Hazlett and Spitzer
1997). In practice, however, the regulations introduced by the cable act capped
prices on a per-channel basis, making the quality/price ratio the relevant unit
of analysis. Despite the higher prices, quality/price ratios are substantially higher
for low- and medium-quality goods (.035, or 16.6 percent) and marginally lower
(by .006, or 2.1 percent) for high-quality goods. Note these effects are exactly
what are predicted by Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1988) and suggest that
consumers may well have benefited from the regulations introduced by the 1992
cable act, not because of lower prices from the imposition of price caps but
because of significantly increased quality for a slightly higher price from the
introduction of MQSs. While a detailed welfare analysis is beyond the scope of
this study, this suggests at worst a distributional impact from the regulations,
with low-taste (presumably low-income) consumers benefiting at the expense
of high-taste (high-income) consumers.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we measure the extent of quality degradation in cable television
markets. Using an empirical framework taken from the standard theoretical
nonlinear pricing models, we recover the quality levels of the offered cable
services as well as features of the distribution of consumer preferences. These
measures allow us to directly quantify the degree of quality degradation in cable
markets. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45
percent of observed service qualities. Furthermore, local regulatory oversight is
associated with significantly higher quality and lower quality degradation.
Several extensions of the existing analysis are suggested. On institutional
grounds, by developing techniques to accurately measure product quality in the
cable television industry, the failure of the early-1990s cable regulatory experience
seems not so obvious. In light of continued consumer frustration over increasing
cable prices and consequent calls for reregulation, if not of prices then perhaps
of product offerings (see, for example, Consumers Union 2003). Our results
suggest both a more detailed analysis of the effects of past regulations and careful
consideration of the consequences to both prices and qualities of new regulatory
solutions.
On methodological grounds, while the existing specification can recover quite
flexibly the distribution of consumer tastes in each cable market, it does not
admit controlling for observed or unobserved heterogeneity in cost and demand.
Extending it would require pooling information about preferences and costs
across markets but would permit greater confidence in the estimated effects of
endogenous quality as well as measurement of the consumer and social welfare
consequences of endogenous quality choice. Each of these extensions is the topic
of ongoing research (Crawford and Shum 2005).
Furthermore, while the data and industry we study necessitate the analysis of
the monopoly problem, we think the lessons we learn here might apply much
more broadly. First, research into competition with prices and qualities (so-called
competitive nonlinear pricing) finds that rivalry generally reduces distortions in
both dimensions (Stole 2002). As such, our findings provide evidence of how
bad the problem can be. More important, however, is that the methodological
approach we take here—based on the screening literature analyzing nonlinear
pricing—has enormous potential to generalize both to larger, multidimensional,
quality (or characteristic) spaces as well as to competitive settings. Thus it has
the potential to solve the long-standing problem of endogenous product char-
acteristics that is acknowledged in many recent empirical analyses of oligopolistic
markets (see, for example, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995, p. 854; Nevo 2001,
p. 322; Petrin 2003, p. 24). While there are significant computational burdens
involved in both cases (compare Rochet and Stole 2002; Stole 2002), the approach
we take here of allowing continuous distributions of consumer preferences but
discrete goods offered by firms may be both empirically realistic and tractably
extensible in one or both dimensions.
Regulation in Cable Television 213
Appendix A
Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented in this paper rely on some fairly strong assumptions
about the nature of preferences and costs. In this Appendix, we consider the
sensitivity of our results to these assumptions.
As the form of the surplus function critically determines the magnitude of
the first-best qualities and, hence, the extent of degradation, we focus on the
sensitivity of our results to the assumed parametric form of the cost function,
which is one component of the surplus function. In particular, we consider the
consequences to our results if costs are of the form
1
r1C(q )p q . (A1)i i
r 1
Marginal costs for quality are , which imply that r measures the′ rC (q )p qi i
rate at which marginal costs for quality increase with quality. In the baseline
specifications reported above, we chose , which implies that marginal costsrp 1
increase linearly with .qi
Unfortunately, as we are just identified in each market, we cannot separately
identify r in the data.47 Instead, we solve the model for various values of r and
assess the robustness of our conclusions to these assumptions.
Tables A2–A4 present the results of these tests. Table A2 presents parameter
values and implied qualities consistent with different values of the cost curvature
parameter r. Note that corresponds to the baseline results presented inrp 1
Tables 5–8. As is evident, the cut points of the type distribution, implied qualities,
and quality degradation are each sensitive to assumptions on r. In particular,
as the cost function gets steeper, values for cut types increase, qualities decrease,
and degradation increases.
Nevertheless, while each of the cut types, , and quality, q, are sensitive to r,t
the utility they provide, measured by their product, # q, is not. This can bet
seen in Tables A3 and A4. Table A3 duplicates the quality regressions relating
quality of each offered service to the networks provided on each. While the
parameter estimates vary across the columns, the mean WTP for each network
( ) is quite stable. Similar results obtain for the impact of regulation ont # bk3
cable service quality presented in Table A4. While the parameter estimates vary
with r, the WTP equivalent of each covariate is stable across r. Similar effects
obtain for degradation and price/quality ratios. As a result, we take caution in
making strong claims about magnitudes that are sensitive to r (for example, the
percent quality degradation) but feel confident in our conclusions about mag-
nitudes that appear robust to variation in r.
47 Crawford and Shum (2005) presents a more general model that does estimate the cost (and
preference) structure using a more recent cable dataset.
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Table A2
Parameters and Implied Qualities: Sensitivity Analysis
Variable
rp 1 rp 1.5 rp 2
Three
Good
Two
Good
One
Good
Three
Good
Two
Good
One
Good
Three
Good
Two
Good
One
Good
Types:
t3 5.15 4.77 4.35 7.23 6.55 5.85 9.10 8.02 7.12
t2 4.99 4.65 . . . 6.90 6.33 . . . 8.57 7.74 . . .
t1 4.90 . . . . . . 6.73 . . . . . . 8.31 . . . . . .
Quality:
q 3 5.15 4.77 4.35 3.73 3.49 3.24 3.01 2.82 2.66
q 2 4.43 2.57 . . . 3.22 1.89 . . . 2.60 1.57 . . .
q1 3.42 . . . . . . 2.49 . . . . . . 2.01 . . . . . .
Degradation:
(t  q )/t33 3 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
(t  q )/t22 2 .11 .45 . . . .53 .70 . . . .69 .79 . . .
(t  q )/t11 1 .30 . . . . . . .63 . . . . . . .76 . . . . . .
N 72 240 730 72 240 730 72 240 730
Note. Parameters of net type distribution are obtained using the procedure in Section 4.2. Qualities are
calculated using these values and equation (12). Percentage of degradation was evaluated at cut types, which
are defined as the marginal types just inclined to purchase that quality.
Table A3
Interpreting Quality Measures: Sensitivity Analysis
Variable
rp 1 rp 1.5 rp 2
Estimate
Implied
Mean
WTP Estimate
Implied
Mean
WTP Estimate
Implied
Mean
WTP
WTBS .57 (.03) 2.58 .43 (.02) 2.60 .28 (.02) 2.08
Discovery .14 (.03) .62 .09 (.02) .57 .03 (.02) .22
ESPN .94 (.04) 4.25 .70 (.03) 4.29 .49 (.02) 3.66
USA .28 (.03) 1.25 .21 (.02) 1.31 .11 (.02) .79
CSPAN .08 (.03) .35 .05 (.02) .31 .03 (.02) .20
TNT .03 (.03) .13 .03 (.02) .18 .03 (.02) .21
Family .38 (.03) 1.71 .27 (.02) 1.67 .22 (.02) 1.64
Nashville .25 (.03) 1.14 .18 (.02) 1.08 .12 (.02) .87
Lifetime .04 (.03) .16 .02 (.02) .15 .01 (.02) .10
CNN .15 (.03) .66 .11 (.02) .68 .03 (.02) .19
A&E .24 (.03) 1.06 .17 (.02) 1.06 .13 (.02) .96
Weather .01 (.03) .02 .01 (.02) .05 .04 (.02) .30
QVC .56 (.03) 2.51 .40 (.02) 2.44 .40 (.02) 2.96
Learning .09 (.03) .42 .05 (.02) .32 .07 (.02) .55
MTV .18 (.03) .81 .13 (.02) .77 .11 (.02) .84
Other networks .04 (.00) .20 .03 (.00) .18 .03 (.00) .19
Note. Coefficient estimates are from regressions of recovered quality levels on broadcast and cable pro-
gramming variables. Reported are results for the top 15 cable networks listed in Table 2. Data are pooled
across all markets and across all bundles within a market. Standard errors are in parentheses. Implied
willingness to pay (WTP) values are from the authors’ calculations. The estimated WTP is the product of
the regression coefficient in the estimate column and the average (across all markets) estimated WTP for
quality of the consumer just willing to purchase the high-quality bundle.
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